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determination.' 13 Certainly, the difficulties inherent in the
instant case, which could arise in other similar cases, would
suggest the desirability of prompt legislative attention to
this practical solution of the problem. 4
RiCHAmD E. LOVELL
J. PAUL ROGERs

Recent Decisions
Attorneys' Fees - Standard For Fixing Attorneys' Fees
Under Anti-Trust Laws. Noerr Motor Freight v. Eastern

RailroadPres.Conf., 166 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Pa.1958). Plaintiff obtained a judgment in a private action under the Sher-

man Anti-trust law. He was entitled under the statute to
treble damages ".

.

. and the cost of the suit including a

reasonable attorneys' fee." 15 U.S.C.A. (1951) § 15. Generally speaking, a reasonable attorneys' fee in such a judgment is within the discretion of the trial court and an appellate court will intervene only if this discretion has been
abused. Here the District Court suggested a test in which
seven factors are to be considered in determining a reasonable fee. These factors are: (1) whether plaintiff's counsel
had the benefit of a prior judgment or decree in a case
brought by the government; (2) the standing of counsel at
the bar - both counsel receiving the award and opposing
counsel; (3) time and labor spent; (4) magnitude and complexity of the litigation; (5) responsibility undertaken; (6)
the amount recovered; and (7) the knowledge the Court
has of the conferences, arguments that were presented and
work shown by the record to have been done by attorneys
for plaintiff prior to trial. The test is then stated to be
"what, in the opinion of the Trial Judge, after considering
all the factors in the case (including but not limited to those
outlined above) would be a reasonable charge for the services of plaintiffs' counsel?" [170].
In addition to the test stated in the present case, the
court pointed out that two other tests have been proposed.
Cape Cod Food Products v. National CranberryAss'n., 119
F. Supp. 242 (D.C. Mass. 1954), set forth the test as to what
constituted a reasonable attorneys' fee within the meaning
-Ibid., 214.
1 For example, Virginia has exempted liens upon motor vehicles from the
normal requirements of recording and provides for recordation of such liens
with the Department of Motor Vehicles. The liens as then noted upon the
certificate of title to the particular automobile thereby give notice throughout the entire State. See 7 VA. CODE (1958) §46.1-69, et 8eq.
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of the Clayton Act as " 'what it would be reasonable for
counsel to charge a victorious plaintiff. The rate is the free
market price, the figure which a willing successful client
would pay a willing, successful lawyer'" [169]. The other
test was proposed in Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard
Motor Car Co., (Holtzoff, J., unreported), cited in the instant case. The judge here made no attempt to fix the fee
a lawyer should charge his client, but instead stated: "Although there are some expressions to the contrary, it is the
view of this Court that in such a case as this, it is not the
function of the court to fix the fee that counsel should
charge his client, and then assess that against the defendant. My conception is that it is the duty of the court to
determine what contribution shall be made by the defendant toward the fees of plaintiff's counsel. I say lest there
be any misunderstanding, it is not my intention to determine or express an opinion or even an intimation how much
plaintiff's counsel should charge his client" [169].
Conflict Of Laws - Alienation Of Affections. Albert v.
McGrath, 165 F. Supp. 461 (D.C.D.C. 1958). Plaintiff
brought an action in the District Court for the District of
Columbia to recover for alienation of her husband's affections. The alleged misconduct between defendant and plaintiff's husband was said to have taken place in the District
of Columbia at a time when both the plaintiff and her
husband were Maryland residents. Since Maryland has
abolished the action for alienation of affections, 7 MD. CODE
(1957) Art. 75C, § 1, plaintiff's recovery had to be under
the law of the District of Columbia where such actions are
still allowed. The District Court found that the law of the
state of the matrimonial domicile, Maryland, governed in
the present case, and rendered a judgment n.o.v. for the
defendant. The court concluded that for purposes of alienation of affection suits the law of the place where the injury
is sustained is the governing law and that the situs of the
matrimonial domicle is the only place where the injury
can be sustained. For a case reaching an opposite result
see Gordon v. Parker,83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949), 178
F. 2d 888 (1st Cir. 1949), although the conflict of laws question was not raised on the appeal. See also 41 Mich. L.
Rev. 83, 89-98 (1942).
Corporations - Retention Of Corporate Criminal Liability After Dissolution. Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United
States, 258 F. 2d 726 (4th Cir. 1958). Appellant corpora-
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tions were convicted under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A.
(1951) §§ 1, 2, of conspiring to fix liquor prices and attempting to monopolize interstate trade and commerce. The indictments under which appellants were convicted were
issued prior to appellants' dissolution and were pending
at the time of dissolution. Appellants maintained that dissolution of the corporate defendants extinguished any criminal liability of the corporation arising from criminal proceedings pending at the time of dissolution. The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that under 2 MD. CODE
(1957) Art. 23, §§ 76(b), 78 and 8 DEL. C. (1953) § 278,
criminal as well as civil liability of a corporation survives
dissolution. The Court of Appeals in construing the Delaware statute followed the view taken by the Seventh Circuit
in United States v. P. F. Collier & Son Corp., 208 F. 2d 936
(7th Cir. 1953). For a case reaching the opposite conclusion as to the meaning of the Delaware Statute see United
States v. Line Material Co., 202 F. 2d 929 (6th Cir. 1953).
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari
in the present case.
Criminal Law - De Novo Appeal. Moulden v. State,
217 Md. 351,142 A. 2d 595 (1958). Defendant appealed from
a sentence of the People's Court of Montgomery County,
under the de novo appeal procedure of 6 MD. CODE (1957)
Art. 66%, Sec. 325. The Circuit Court hearing the case de
novo imposed a sentence upon the defendant in excess of
the sentence given him by the People's Court. The court
then suspended the execution of these sentences and placed
the defendant on probation. Defendant violated probation,
and the Circuit Court struck out the suspensions of sentences and reinstated them in conformity with its original
pronouncement. Defendant contends that the Circuit Court
acting in its special limited jurisdiction as an appellate
court, has no power to impose sentences in excess of that
imposed by the magistrate of the People's Court. Defendant relied upon 1 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 5, Secs. 30 and 39,
which he asserted stripped the Circuit Court of the power
to increase any fine imposed by a magistrate or impose
imprisonment for more than thirty days upon default in
payment of such fines.
The Court of Appeals held that 6 MD. CODE (1957) Art.
66%, Sec. 1, which makes Art. 66/2 the exclusive and controlling state-wide law as to matters covered by it unless
the legislature specifically otherwise provides, was not
specifically contradicted by 1 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 5, Secs.
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30 and 39. Therefore, the Circuit Court possessed the authority on a de novo appeal to impose any fine within limits
set by the applicable statutes [6 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 66 ,
Secs. 112, 206, 209], and to require imprisonment for more
than thirty days in default in payment of fines [4 MD. CODE
(1957) Art. 38, Sec. 4]. The Court of Appeals in the instant
case noted that earlier Maryland cases have given indications that Maryland followed the general rule on de novo
appeal, i.e., "the upper court hears the case as if it were
being tried for the first time, and considers the entire
matter of verdict, judgment and sentence as though there
had been no trial below" [356].
See Green v. State, 170 Md. 134, 183 A. 526 (1936), Robb
v. State, 190 Md. 641, 60 A. 2d 211 (1948), Johnson v. State,
191 Md. 447, 62 A. 2d 249 (1948), and Hite v. State, 198 Md.
602, 84 A. 2d 899 (1951), for cases involving appeals to the
Circuit Court. See also Baltimore City Charter (Flack
1949), Sec. 411, which provides for a de novo appeal in
certain cases involving a justice of the peace assigned to
a police station in Baltimore City.
Due Process - Privilege Against Disclosure Of Identity
Of Informer. McCoy v. State, 216 Md. 332, 140 A. 2d 689
(1958). Defendant was convicted of violating the narcotics
drug law. During the trial, in which accused was charged
with the sale of narcotics to an informer, the State failed
to call the informer as a witness. Defendant contended
that this failure to produce the informer amounted to a
denial of due process. In affirming the lower court's conviction, the Court of Appeals recognized the principle that
the State ordinarily possesses a privilege of non-disclosure
and is not required to divulge the names of persons who
furnish information concerning violations of the law to a
law officer. This privilege is, however, subject to some
qualifications. The privilege does not exist, for instance, in
such cases as the present one where the informer is an
integral part of the illegal transaction, unless the informer
was already known to the accused or the accused failed to
make a proper demand for the identity of the informer at
the trial.
In the present case defendant knew the informer's
identity and yet failed to call him as a witness or request
that the State explain his absence. In addition to this,
police officers had voluntarily disclosed the name of the informer during the course of the trial. Under these circumstances the Court held that the failure of the State to
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produce the informer did not amount to a denial of due
process. See also MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE (1954) 309, Sec.

148, 8 WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE

(3d ed. 1940), 755, Sec. 2374 (2);

60 Yale L. J. 1091 (1951) and 63 Yale L. J. 206 (1953).
Insurance - Alteration Of Policy Application. Syme v.
Bankers National Life Insurance Company, 393 Pa. 600,
144 A. 2d 845 (1958). Insured signed an application for an insurance policy with a face value of $25,000 and family benefits of $250 per month. The general agent of the insurer
placed an addendum on the face of this application after the
insured had signed it, requesting that another policy be
issued to insured with a $25,000 face value, but with increased family benefits of $500 per month. Insured accepted the policy providing for the $500 benefits in lieu
of the policy he had originally requested. In an action by
the beneficiaries on the policy, insurer denied liability on
the basis of allegedly false statements made by insured in
his application. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that the statements made by the insured in his policy
application could not be used as a basis of a defense in the
action on the policy. A Pennsylvania statute, 40 PuI oN's
P.S. (1954) § 441 provided that:
"All insurance policies,... in which the application
of the insured,... form part of the policy or contract
between the parties thereto, or have any bearing on
said contract, shall contain, or have attached to said
policies, correct copies of the application as signed by
the applicant,... ; and, unless so attached and accompanying the policy, no such application . . . shall be
received in evidence in any controversy between the
parties..., nor shall any such application... be considered a part of the policy or contract between such
parties."
The Court held that the general agent's addendum had
rendered insured's original policy application incorrect
within the meaning of the statute and that this precluded
the insurer from using any false statements insured might
have made in the "incorrect" copy. The court rejected insurer's argument that the insured had ratified the policy
change by his acceptance of the new policy.
5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 48A, § 169 provides that no alteration of a life insurance application can be made without
the insured's consent. Sec. (b) provides:
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"Any insurer issuing such insurance contract upon
such application unlawfully altered by its officer, employee, or agent shall not have available in any action
arising out of such contract, any defense which is based
upon the fact of such alteration, or as to any item in the
application which was so altered."
Furthermore, § 170 provides that a true copy of the application must be attached to any issued policy for the application to be admissible in evidence.
As yet these statutes have not been construed, but if the
decision of the Pennsylvania court is indicative of the
Maryland attitude, the cumulative effect of these provisions might be sufficient to bar the defensive use of insured's
application by the insurer in similar circumstances.
Taxation - Relocation Expenses. United States v.
Woodall, 255 F. 2d 370 (10th Cir. 1958) Plaintiff accepted
a job on condition he would be reimbursed for expenses
he incurred in moving his family to the new job location.
Plaintiff contended the money he received for his moving
expenses did not constitute income within the meaning of
1954 I.R.C. § 61 and in the alternative, that he was entitled
to a business deduction under 1954 I.R.C. § 162. The Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in reversing a lower
court decision in favor of the taxpayer, held that the
payments were income and disallowed the business expense
deduction. "'The job, not the taxpayers' pattern of living,
must require the travel" [373] for the expense deduction
to be allowed. The court stressed the fact that plaintiff's
expenses were incurred in obtaining employment but not
in the course of employment.
Taxation - Trade Or Business Expense. John W. Clark
v. Commissioner, 30 TC No. 140, CCH Tax Ct. Rep. Dec.
23, 190 (1958). Plaintiff seeks to deduct attorney's fees and
expenses incurred in the defense and settlement of an assault suit. Petitioner, the branch manager of a company
engaged in soliciting magazine subscriptions, was charged
with assault with intent to rape a prospective employee.
Plaintiff had a business duty to interview and obtain the
consent of husbands before hiring their wives as employees.
Petitioner was visiting the prospective employee's home
for the purpose of obtaining this consent when the assault
allegedly occurred. The Tax Court, four judges dissenting,
allowed both deductions as ordinary and necessary business
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expenses under 1954 I.R.C. § 162. The Tax Court, after
accepting petitioner's testimony as to what actually took
place at the time of his visit, found that taxpayer's expenses
were sufficiently connected with petitioner's trade or business to allow the deductions. Since the criminal charges
against the petitioner were dismissed, the court presumed
he was innocent of the acts charged.
Torts - Immunity Of Charitable Institutions. Collopy
v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary,27 N.J. 29, 141 A. 2d 276
(1958). Plaintiff brought an action to recover for the negligence of the defendant hospital. Defendant claimed immunity from any tort liability by virtue of its status as an
eleemosynary institution. The appellate court held that
New Jersey no longer recognizes the doctrine that charitable institutions are immune from tort liability. The court
based its decision on the general principle that it is basically unjust to allow a charitable institution to avoid responsibility for torts which it has committed.
Maryland has long recognized the immunity of charitable institutions from tort liability, basing this exemption
on the so-called "trust fund" theory: See Perry v. House
of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885); Loeffler v. Sheppard-Pratt
Hosp., 130 Md. 265, 100 A. 301 (1917); and article, 5 Md. L.

Rev. 336 (1941). However, 5

MD. CODE

(1957) Art. 48A,

§ 85, which requires insurance policies issued to charitable
institutions for the purpose of covering tort liability to
contain a provision that the insurer will be estopped from
asserting the immunity defense, appears to furnish a possibility for recovery by the injured party up to the amount
of the insurance carried, although several decisions indicate procedural difficulties in perfecting the relief: Thomas
v. Prince George's County, 200 Md. 554, 92 A. 2d 452 (1952),
noted, 15 Md. L. Rev. 170 (1955); Gorman v. St. Paul Fire
Ins. Co., 210 Md. 1, 121 A. 2d 812 (1956), noted 17 Md. L. Rev.
159 (1957); and State v. Arundel Park Corporation, ......
Md ....... 147 A. 2d 427 (1959).
In a per curiam opinion, ...... Md ....... ..... A. 2d ......
(1959), The Daily Record, Feb. 28, 1959, the Court of Appeals again flatly refused to repudiate the immunity doctrine, saying that to do so would be "judicial legislation",
and with reference to CODE, Art. 48A, Sec. 85, that: "There
is no merit in the contention that the appellee defendant in
this case should be liable because it was insured for general
liability, as professional negligence, which forms the basis
of this suit, was excluded from coverage."
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Trade Names - Extent Of Protection Afforded Holder
Of Trade Name. Great A. & P. Co. v. A. & P. Trucking
Corp., 51 N.J.S. 412, 144 A. 2d 172 (1958). Plaintiff retail
store sought to enjoin defendant from using letters "A &P"
on its trucks and stationery as part of defendant's corporate
name. The appellate court granted limited relief by requiring defendant to reduce the "A & P" to the same size,
spacing and color as the rest of its corporate name but refused to enjoin the use altogether.
The court acknowledged that a prior user of a trade
name may obtain injunctive relief even against a noncompeting user of its trade name if there is a strong likelihood of harm to the prior user's business resulting from
the subsequent user's conduct. The court adopted the view
of 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938), § 730, Comment b, p.
599: "The issue in each case is whether the goods, services or businesses of the actor and of the other are sufficiently related so that the alleged infringement would subject the good-will and reputation of the other's trade-mark
or trade name to the hazards of the actor's business." In
the present case the court found that the plaintiff had failed
to show that any harm had been, or would be, caused to
plaintiff's business by use of defendant's trade name. Still,
the appellate court did extend some limited relief to the
plaintiff, chiefly on the basis advanced by the lower court,
i.e., "in order that complete equity may be accomplished
in the instant case" [174].
The Maryland Court of Appeals has frequently stated
the view that the basis for relief in trade name - unfair
competition cases is constantly expanding. So far, however, where the possibility of confusion caused by similarity of trade names has been found to exist, a disclaimer
of connection by the subsequent user with the business of
the prior user has been held to afford sufficient protection
to said prior trade name user. A. Weiskittel Co. v. Weiskittel Co., 167 Md. 306, 173 A. 48 (1934); Nat. Shoe v. Nat.
Shoes of N. Y., 213 Md. 328, 131 A. 2d 909 (1957). The
Maryland court's attitude toward trade names is well set
out in the National Shoe case at p. 339: "While courts have
been slow to enjoin altogether the use of similar names,
they have not been slow to minimize confusion, where a
probability of confusion is shown." See Hecht v. Rosenberg, 165 Md. 116, 166 A. 440 (1933); Drive It Yourself Co.
v. North, 148 Md. 609, 130 A. 57 (1925); Bedding Corporation v. Moses, 182 Md. 229, 34 A. 2d 338 (1943); Edmondson
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Vil. Theatre v. Einbinder,208 Md. 38, 116 A. 2d 377 (1955);
A & H Trans. v. Save Way, 214 Md. 325, 135 A. 2d 289 (1957).
See also 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 191 which makes
fraudulent use or imitation of a trade name a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of $100 a day as long as the offense is
repeated.
Unauthorized Practice Of Law - Labor Unions. In
re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150
N.E. 2d 163 (1958). Sixteen lawyers located throughout the
United States entered into a legal aid agreement with a
railroad trainmen's union. These lawyers were designated
by the union as regional counsel for its legal aid program
and as such handled claims arising from injuries or deaths
of the Brotherhood's members occurring within the scope
of their employment.
Under this arrangement the lawyers charged a contingent fee of 25% of any amount recovered, paid all expenses of investigation and litigation and paid the total
cost of operating the union legal aid department. The
union, in turn, distributed to its injured members blank
copies of contracts employing the regional counsel's firm
as their attorney and also urged its members to employ
regional counsel.
An Illinois statute [ILL. REV. STAT. (1957 Supp.), Chap.
13, § 15] provided that:
"It shall be unlawful for any person not an attorney
at law to solicit for money, fee, commission, or other
remuneration directly or indirectly in any manner
whatsoever, any demand or claim for personal injuries
or for death, for the purpose of having an action
brought thereon, or for the purpose of settling the
same."
The Court held that the activities of the labor union fell
within the purview of the statute and therefore condemned
these activities as constituting the unauthorized practice
of the law. The Court went on to outline how the union
might operate its legal aid program in the future without
becoming guilty of unauthorized practice. The union may
maintain an investigation staff and investigate all circumstances under which its members are injured. The Brotherhood may also make known the advisability of obtaining
legal advice before making a settlement and the names
of attorneys who in its opinion have the capacity to handle
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such claims successfully. The union, however, can no
longer have any financial connection with lawyers; nor can
any lawyer pay any amount whatsoever to the union or its
officers or members as compensation, reimbursement of expenses, or gratuity in connection with the procurement of
a case. In addition, the union may no longer fix attorney's
fees, nor allow its members to carry lawyer employment
contracts to other injured members.
The Supreme Court based its decision on the necessity
of keeping the relation of attorney-client both a personal
and an individual one.
Maryland has similar, although more general statutes
than Illinois; see Rec. Dec., 18 Md. L. Rev. 358 (1958).
Unfair Competition - Medicine - Use Of Similar Nonfunctional Color Barred. Norwich PharmacalCo. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 427 (N.D.N.Y. 1958). Plaintiff
has since 1900 manufactured and distributed in a clear glass
bottle a pink-colored stomach remedy known as PeptoBismol. In 1955, defendant marketed a pink-colored stomach remedy in a clear glass bottle under the name of Pepsamar. The evidence disclosed that defendant's sole reason
for the selection of the color pink was to make defendant's
product appear as much as possible like plaintiff's product.
Defendant also utilized the color pink in the advertising
of its product. The District Court issued an injunction restraining defendant from simulating the pink color of plaintiff's product unless defendant concealed the color by use
of a dark bottle. The injunction also restrained defendant
from using this descriptive pink color in advertising its
product. The Court found that defendant had intentionally
copied nonfunctional attributes of plaintiff's product and
had failed to show that no likelihood of confusion would
arise from this simulation. See Recent Decision on Trade
Names, supra, p. 88, for Maryland cases in the unfair competition area.

